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Introduction  
Daniela BERTI & Devika BORDIA  
 
 
 
/p.1/ 
 
This book provides an anthropological approach to 
examining the way criminal cases are dealt with by courts in 
South Asia. It takes criminal cases as a framework to study 
how power dynamics and individual strategies either comply 
or clash with a legal setting. The case-study approach that is 
used here allows us to examine a set of state and non-state 
institutions and the practices of people associated with them. 
It helps to analyse the underlying tension in institutional 
contexts between legal practitioners such as police officers, 
lawyers, and judges who orient their claims towards 
neutralism, objectivity, and equality and a set of everyday 
interactions and decisions where cultural, social, economic, 
and political factors play a major role.  
Our argument is that criminal cases offer a means of 
studying a wide scope of social issues from the vantage point 
of litigation and negotiation. The contributions to this volume 
focus on acts that the state has classed as criminal, ranging 
from those that were defined as a crime when the Indian 
Penal Code was first drafted in 1860 such as murder and rape 
to events that that have more recently been criminalized, such 
as atrocities against Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes 
and violence against women. Laws that criminalize practices 
like domestic violence and caste atrocity have enabled 
activists to garner attention toward certain issues and to build 
networks within police and court institu /p.2/ tions. Activists 
have approached the legal institutions and advocated for legal 
reform based on different motivations and intentions, and this 
has shaped the discourse and idioms that animate different 
social movements. Other cases reveal some resistance within 
society to conform to the changing definition of crime that is 
introduced by legislation subsequent to new state 
commitments. They also show how judicial procedures at 
play in a given society succeed in enforcing unpopular social 
and cultural reforms or, on the contrary, how resistance to 
these reforms impacts the judicial process.  
From a methodological point of view, the ethnography of 
court cases proposed here mainly relies on narrative 
constructions. Its aim is not to reconstruct facts but to see 
how opposing parties try to uphold contrasting versions of 
these facts. These ‘stories’ that are strategically built in 
accordance with procedural constraints are eventually legally 
proven or ultimately challenge the opponent’s version. The 
official version of the story produced at the time of the trial is 
often the result of more informal, under-the-table interactions 
and negotiations which may have occurred well before the 
trial itself and are based on power relationships, political 
pressure, or, sometimes, monetary transactions. This book 
focuses on formal and informal interactions between the 
various actors involved in a criminal case: the accused, police 
officers, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, witnesses, local 
leaders, and community members. 
 
 
Court Case Approach 
 
The heuristic potential of court cases to provide an 
understanding of the society in which they occur has been 
widely explored in the field of history. Court documents have 
been used by historians as a way to capture cultural tension 
which lends an in-depth understanding of the crucial 
transformations at work in a society over a given period. One 
example is a double volume entitled ‘On Trial: American 
History through Court Proceedings and Hearings’ (Marcus 
and Marcus 2006), where the authors collected edited 
transcripts of trials for use in American history classes. 
Starting with the transcriptions of hearings for a series of 
criminal cases, students are taught about important topics in 
American history, such as the American Civil War and 
Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan, and the beginning of 
protective labour legislation.  
/p.3/ 
Similarly, historians specializing in Europe have 
traditionally used trials as a historical source. Subsequent to 
Ginzburg’s works on witchcraft trials in particular, it is now 
current practice for historians to draw on court documents to 
provide information not only on the history of judicial 
institutions (Farge 2001) but also on aspects of everyday life 
which, being rather commonplace, are not mentioned in other 
sources. Court documents have in fact been used to study 
how the body was perceived and how emotions were 
expressed by witnesses testifying before tribunals during the 
Inquisition in the thirteenth century (Cheirézy 2009); or to 
analyze the perception and the definition of incest in 
nineteenth century France (Giuliani 2009); or even to 
document the unknown sleeping habits of French working 
classes in the eighteenth century (Garnier 2009).  
Historians have not only used judicial documents as 
sources for their research. They have also developed an 
epistemological reflection on the nature of these sources. 
They have questioned the kind of voices expressed by these 
sources and the way they are to be used, the research 
strategies that have to be followed in dealing with them and 
the way to interpret these sources. One major issue is whether 
it is possible to extract from these judicial sources a 
testimony (Farge and Cerutti 2009) that has not already been 
structured by a juridical language or if, on the contrary, these 
sources are entirely shaped by juridical forms of knowledge 
and power. More specifically, historians have argued that the 
voices heard in court reports—that of the judge, of witnesses, 
of experts—are all distorted by a deforming mirror: the 
transcription by the court clerk; the witnesses’ attitude 
towards the judge; understanding justice as a system of 
authority (Giuliani 2009: 21). In other words, they have 
underlined the need to take into account the relationship 
between written documents and the situational framework in 
which these documents have been produced: the fact that the 
witness report is the result of an interrogation; that the 
witness report may also be influenced by the attitudes and 
personalities of the judicial officers; or by the way the 
witness regards the justice system, and many other contextual 
factors. In spite of being an ‘imperfect archive’ (Giuliani 
op. cit) judicial documents are an integral part of historical 
research and they are even considered to be one of the only 
ways many people in past societies had to express themselves 
and to be heard up to the present time (Garnier 2009).  
/p.4/ 
The importance attributed to the oral nature of court 
interactions has been at the very heart of the research carried 
out over the last decades on American and European trials by 
ethnomethodologists and conversational analysts keen to 
study the linguistic mechanisms through which legal power is 
achieved. These authors have looked in detail at oral 
interactions and examined the mechanisms that lie behind 
courtroom talk, the power relationships between protagonists, 
and the strategies used by judicial professionals to turn the 
situation to their advantage (Atkinson and Drew 1979; 
Conley and O’Barr 1990; Drew and Heritage 1992; Gnisci 
and Pontecorvo 2004). Most of these works have treated the 
courtroom as an empirical setting where power can be 
observed in action through language (O’Barr 1982; Conley 
and O’Barr 2005). Here, power means what emanates from 
the linguistic mechanisms of talk in the courtroom, from 
institutional legal roles, from professional speech styles. It is 
power to control a setting where the rules and turns of speech 
are very different from those used in everyday conversation 
(Conley and O’Barr 1990: 21), where some are authorized to 
speak and others are restricted to giving answers, where by 
using a legal questioning technique, professionals transform a 
dialogue into a self-serving monologue. Some authors have 
also examined the social values behind courtroom 
conversations. One example is Matoesian’s work on rape 
where the author argues that talk in the courtroom not only 
enacts the power of legal institutions but also reproduces the 
social value of patriarchy and male hegemony in society 
(Matoesian 1993: 215; see also Conley and O’Barr 2005).  
Anthropologists working in non-Western countries 
recently adopted this method (Hirsch 1998; Dupret 2006; 
Chang 2004; Richland 2008; Stiles 2009; Svongoro 2011), 
with the exception of those working in India and other South 
Asian regions where very little research is done on 
courtrooms. In fact, while historians specializing in India 
have often drawn on trial reports as precious sources of 
information (Singha 1998; Freitag 1991), court cases have 
received little attention by anthropologists. Besides the 
pioneering works by Marc Galanter, in the 1990s, studies on 
South Asia started to take into account district court 
(Das 1996; Agnes 2004) or appeal court judgements which 
had repercussions on various aspects of contemporary Indian 
society. These studies have, however, mainly focused on the 
content of the judicial decision and on the implications that 
this decision could have from a political /p.5/ science, 
juridical, or sociological perspective.
1
 What has been 
neglected is not only the form in which these judgments have 
been drawn up (from a linguistic and ‘discursive’ point of 
view) but also the complex and long-term judicial story of 
the case; this includes a multitude of professional and 
non-professional actors, of official and non-official 
interactions and has produced a number of legal (written) 
documents and contrasted (oral) narratives.  
 
The argument put forward in this volume is that courtroom 
ethnography has to take into account not only the official 
reports provided by courts, but also the ways in which these 
documents are produced in the first place and the discourse 
that is held inside and outside the courtroom by the actors 
involved in the case. On the one hand, judicial reports and 
official documents may help to recreate the ‘texture’ by 
which the court and society have exchanged, formulated, 
negotiated, or opposed conflicting opinions on a register that 
is ‘rule-oriented’ (Conley and O’Barr 1990). On the other 
hand, the ethnographic investigation of courts and the 
collection of narratives and practices outside courtrooms may 
provide a more ‘relation-oriented’ version of legal facts—a 
version expressed by the parties actually involved in the case, 
whose logic and points of view are deeply entrenched in 
social ties, economic interests, feelings, conflicts, or loyalties 
(Berti 2011).  
Anthropological research carried out in the field of legal 
practice in South Asia initially focused on village disputes 
and on the tactical possibilities offered by the coexistence of 
‘indigenous’ and official laws. Srinivas’ idea of ‘bi-legality’ 
(Srinivas 1964) by which he wanted to describe villagers’ 
attitudes to using both ‘indigenous’ and official law in 
accordance with their own estimations of propriety and 
advantage was developed by Cohn (1987a, 1987b) who 
insisted on the importance of analysing both what may 
induce villagers to choose between one or another system of 
justice-making, and what kind of consequence the choice 
may have on relationships in the village. Cohn emphasized 
villagers’ attitudes to using the court not to settle disputes but 
to further them, so that most of the cases that go into courts 
are ‘fabrications to cover the real disputes’ (Cohn 1987: 90).  
Ethnographic fieldwork has highlighted, on the one hand, 
the existence of local procedures of justice-making (Hayden 
1984) and, on the other hand, the complex interaction 
between the official representation of south Asian legal 
traditions and the everyday practice of /p.6/ justice-making 
which is often informed by the pragmatic combination of 
older and newer legal procedures (Moore 1998).The 
emphasis these authors lay on the contradictions and 
oppositions between ‘state’ versus ‘indigenous’ customs has 
been partly criticized by Anderson (1990) who, by referring 
to recent Indian medieval historiography, underlines the fact 
that the coexistence of a centralized political power with 
local dynamics of loyalty and authority existed even during 
the pre-colonial period. It is not therefore a consequence of 
the post-colonial period. He also criticizes the fact that these 
studies emphasize cultural differences to the detriment of an 
understanding of ‘how the structural distribution of political 
authority is related to processes of production and social 
reproduction’ (Anderson 1990: 163).  
Drawing on Galanter’s postulate that courts of justice 
provide a window onto significant facets of Indian society 
(Galanter 1972), the chapters presented in this volume 
explore the relevance of analyzing criminal cases from an 
anthropological perspective. The volume relies on the 
theoretical assumption that the study of these judicial cases in 
all their multifaceted complexity provides a pertinent and 
original angle from which to access some issues of 
contemporary India, as well as a variety of frameworks 
where the interactions between different forms of operative 
power and authority may be observed.  
 
 
Courts Proceedings and Legal Narratives    
 
The question raised by the afore-mentioned historians 
regarding the way judicial documents are recorded is of 
crucial import in the context examined here. In fact, although 
Indian criminal procedures apply the so-called principle of 
orality according to which evidence against /p.7/ the 
defendant must be presented by witnesses in court and must 
be subject to cross-examination, the judicial practice 
attributes a crucial role to writing because what witnesses say 
before the judge is recorded in writing during the trial. Oral 
evidence is produced in court mostly so that it can be put on 
record. The observation of a criminal trial highlights the 
creative process of legal transcription similarly to what Stiles 
(2009) wrote in her ethnography on Islamic courts in 
Zanzibar. The author refers to the work of the historian Leslie 
Peirce who noted that the different ways in which the 
litigant’s testimony was recorded in documents in 
sixteenth-century Ottoman Islamic courts was to be 
interpreted both as a consequence of restrictions on 
procedures and as a way of preserving communal well-being. 
Using the linguistic notion of ‘entextualization’ (Bauman and 
Briggs 1990), of creating ‘extractable’ texts from oral 
discourse, she shows how Zanzibar court narratives are 
framed differently throughout the proceedings by litigants, by 
clerks, and by judges, each of them emphasizing different 
legal issues by building on previous entextualizations of the 
dispute (Stiles 2009: 35).  
 
Interactions in Court    
The process of entextualization is particularly relevant to 
the judicial settings studied here. In fact, contrary to what 
Dupret observed in reference to Egyptian courts for example, 
where the evidence has already been written by the lawyer 
and by the prosecutor before the trial, and where court 
hearings are ‘weakly interactive’ (Dupret 2006: 153), in 
Indian courts the examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses and the transformation of question-answers into 
written documents occur at the trial itself. The production of 
court documents in India is the result of oral exchanges 
which are often extremely tense and where, as in other 
common law systems, questioning is carried out with the aim 
of suggesting something rather than of obtaining an answer 
(Conley and O’Barr 2005: 26).
3
 The writing process enables 
legal professionals (the lawyer, the prosecutor, or the judge), 
who master the relevant writing techniques to transform the 
questions into witnesses’ self-narrations
4 
and put on record 
the crucial points which they wish to suggest.  
The long and meticulous recording of evidence in Indian 
trials (Annoussamy 1996: 78) strongly contrasts with the 
French procedure described by Bouillier (in this volume) 
where nothing of what witnesses /p.8/ say during the 
hearings is transcribed by the court. Similarly, the eloquent 
nature of the French plaidoirie, is markedly different from 
the way ‘arguments’ are conducted in India, which mostly 
consists in reading aloud before the judge (who follows on 
his file) passages of the previously recorded evidence.
5 
 
The role that writing plays during a trial in India and in 
France needs to be understood in relation to the different 
ways the verdict is reached and formulated. As noted by 
Bouillier in this volume, and like other jury-based systems, 
the verdict is given in France Assize Courts by ordinary 
citizens—the jurors—who have no legal background and 
who are asked to decide according to their own ‘intimate 
conviction’ on the basis of what they have heard during the 
trial.
6
 Even though jurors have recently been ordered to 
provide a short report, they do not have to justify their 
decision in writing. The ‘intimate conviction’ according to 
which French jurors are asked to pronounce the final verdict 
contrasts with the technicality of the reasoning process 
through which the judge in India arrives at his verdict. The 
decision here is taken by the judge alone on the basis of his 
own interpretation of what has been ‘put on record’ and by 
taking into account contradictions, procedural mistakes, and 
previous rulings. The role played by the recording of the 
hearings comes across even more clearly during the appeal 
process when the judge decides ‘according to facts and law’ 
by mainly relying on the evidence recorded by the trial court 
years before.  
 
 
Settlement Negotiations    
Observations of the oral and written procedures applied in 
court provide the social anthropologist with an interesting 
setting for studying the way state power is concretely 
implemented and how people organize themselves when 
faced with the state’s legal constraints. Some of the chapters 
in this volume show how the judicial process is constantly 
bent by different kinds of out-of-court negotiations that take 
place between the parties from the time the case is filed to the 
trial itself, all of which ultimately undermines the rule of 
evidence once the judicial process gets under way.  
In the narcotics case discussed by Berti, the negotiations 
prompted witnesses to deny before the judge what had been 
written in the police report at the time they gave their 
statement. Such repudiation led /p.9/ the prosecutor and the 
judge to declare the witness ‘hostile’, which insinuated that 
they had reached some form of compromise with the 
accused. The police officers themselves were eventually 
blamed by the judge for having turned the case around in 
favour of the accused by giving contradicting statements 
during the hearings. In other cases, an out-of-court 
compromise between the parties is tacitly accepted by the 
court or it may even be explicitly requested by the 
judge—somewhat questioning the criminal nature of the 
case.  
Baxi’s chapter presents an inter-caste love story which was 
initially falsely filed as a rape case by the girl’s parents and 
in which the accused, who was asked by the court to reach a 
compromise with the plaintiffs, was happily married with the 
alleged victim when the trial took place. The trial itself then 
became a form of fiction, which was played out by the 
prosecutor and the judge even if there was no longer a case to 
try. Baxi shows the extent to which these dynamics inform 
the legal procedure not only during the investigation, but also 
inside the courtroom when procedures are adjusted to ensure 
that the verdict is in keeping with the compromise that the 
parties reached a long time ago.  
While in Baxi’s case, a compromise is accepted or even 
encouraged by the judge and the prosecutor because of their 
awareness of the non-criminal nature of the case, in other 
cases involving allegations of corruption from the victim’s 
party, the judge’s reasons for encouraging a compromise may 
be more difficult to analyze. In the case discussed by Jaoul, 
for example, the judge’s alleged request that a Dalit reach a 
compromise with the accused from an upper caste was 
presented by a lawyer activist as proof that the judge had 
taken a bribe. Here, far from being condemned by the court, 
an out-of-court compromise is allegedly imposed on the 
victim under the authority of the judge. 
 
Fictional Scenarios    
Verbal exchanges in court are not merely used to 
contradict previous versions recorded during the 
investigations. They also produce new narratives which are 
formulated in anticipation of their prospective use, providing 
the judge with an alternative narrative for the case. One issue 
that is addressed in this book is how narratives are 
formulated during or in view of the trial. In some cases 
multiple overlapping strategies /p.10/ are used by the parties 
(with the help of lawyers) to play around with the different 
legal sections according to their focus of interest. Legal 
narratives and the effects they have during the trial may also 
follow a rather conventional scenario familiar to and often 
produced by legal professionals (Basu, Baxi, and Berti in this 
volume).  
This raises the issue of fiction and plausibility in the 
judicial process. The case discussed by Letizia (in this 
volume) about a Hindu extremist in Nepal accused of placing 
bombs in the city shows how the arguments put forward by 
the defence—use of torture by the police, frame-ups, political 
intervention, weak prosecution—appear to be plausible 
scenarios which guarantee a lenient sentence for the accused. 
The author also analyses the charisma and religious/political 
position of the accused and the context of uncertainty within 
the Hindu majority owing to secularist reforms in Nepal 
might have influenced the decision to have a Chief District 
Officer (instead of a District Court Officer) try the case and 
have ensured full respect of court procedures (for example, 
the lawyers being present).  
Judicial procedures may also be strategically shaped by the 
police and the prosecutor according to the social status of the 
accused or in relation to a specific religious or cultural 
setting. In the case presented by Bordia in this volume, 
concerning a Girassia woman accused of killing her husband, 
the author interprets the judge’s attitude towards the case as a 
consequence of a parallel that non-tribal people make 
between the perceived immorality of tribal practices—in the 
case at hand, the possibility for a Girassia woman to have an 
extramarital relationship— and the culpability of the accused. 
The impact that the social status of the accused has on the 
case also emerges in Redding’s chapter on a criminal case in 
Pakistan that was filed against transgendered individuals 
where the police’s method of identifying individuals 
corresponds to and eventually clashes with the way these 
transgendered individuals are identified in Court (Redding in 
this volume).  
Although, occasional reference to the personality of the 
accused or to their cultural or social background is made by 
the judge or prosecutor during hearings, these references are 
never recorded in the official transcription of the evidence. In 
fact, in Indian judicial procedures, as in other common law 
countries, the personality of the accused or their moral 
behaviour is not explicitly taken into consideration by the 
court. This aspect of the procedure yet again contrasts with 
the context /p.11/ described by Bouillier for French courts 
where psychologists and psychiatrists may be summoned to 
the court to give their opinion. The jurors’ perception of the 
personality of the accused and their social/ cultural 
background, along with the circumstances of the offence, 
play a significant role in the jury’s verdict.  
 
Legislation Through Court Archives    
Court reports have also been used by historians to study 
the reforms the British introduced in legal codes and judicial 
procedures. Freitag (1991), for example, has analyzed how 
attitudes toward criminality may throw light on what she 
calls the ‘social order’ of a particular place and time. She 
draws attention to the transformation which the British 
introduced regarding the perception of crime and in particular 
to what she considers a fundamental distinction in the way 
the raj dealt with what they perceived as crimes committed 
by individuals (‘ordinary crime’) and crimes committed by 
communities (‘extraordinary crime’). By relying on annual 
records of crime and police statistics, she shows how in spite 
of legal codes and of police forces to deal with individual 
crime, the British were much more concerned with what they 
believed to be collective criminal actions aimed at weakening 
the authority of the state (Freitag 1991: 229; see also Yang 
2003).  
Singha’s work is particularly worth mentioning here as it 
touches upon an issue that is addressed in this volume 
concerning the definition of the line between civil and 
criminal jurisdiction during the early colonial period (Singha 
1998: 137 sq.). On the basis of court documents, this author 
shows how a major issue emerging from the cases she 
studied was an attempt to narrow the public dimension of 
certain norms of moral regulation by relegating them to the 
sphere of the domestic and personal. The shifts in the 
commitments and priorities of the colonial and post-colonial 
state had a significant bearing on what would be counted as a 
criminal act. Singha notes that the colonial state wanted to 
‘communicate the idea that the criminal act affected the 
interests of all, i.e. the public interest which the state 
represented, and punishment would be meted out in those 
terms’ (Singha 1998: ix). While the colonial state excluded 
some issues from the criminal process or therein assigned 
them secondary status, the post-colonial policy has gradually 
further extended the category of ‘crime’ to encompass a 
number of /p.12/ social or gender discriminations. Therefore, 
since the 1980s in particular, a number of Acts, for instance 
regarding narcotics, caste atrocity, and violence against 
women, have been passed which have officially criminalized 
practices and some relationships that were previously cul-
turally approved (or tolerated) and legitimated by law.  
The chapters in this volume highlight the different 
contrasting dynamics in the way this legislation is concretely 
and even strategically implemented in court. In the case of 
the Narcotics Drug and Psychotropic Substances Act, for 
example, the state’s attempt to enforce legislation provokes 
opposition from villagers who defend their cannabis-related 
practices as their cultural right to assert their traditional 
multiform domestic use. This cultural argument may also 
adopt an ideological tone and turn into criticism of the state’s 
inefficacity to propose an alternative for villagers’ economic 
subsistence. The state’s efforts to enforce drug legislation are 
explicitly or implicitly challenged here. However, it would be 
reductive to interpret these challenges in terms of a simplistic 
form of opposition between the state/urban elite and village/ 
rural people: firstly, because the economic stakes in narcotic 
practices in certain regions concern many different 
people—from villagers to the international mafia network, 
and even corrupt state representatives (police, land officers, 
and sometimes even legal professionals); secondly, because 
the Court may provide an arena for expressing contrasting 
social dynamics—of both corporatism and antagonism. In 
fact, the idea that a criminal case may be falsely registered to 
settle a village dispute is commonly suggested by both 
villagers and judicial professionals (Berti, in this volume).  
The manipulation of the law by plaintiffs appears to be a 
common aspect of the colonial and pre-colonial period, 
which according to Cohn (1955) and Benton (2002: 135) 
would be due to the existence of a plural legal landscape and 
to the tactical possibilities that such a legal plurality offered. 
This plurality of choice also occurs within the state system 
where people navigate within state law, between civil and 
criminal sections (Sharafi 2010). However, what seems to 
characterize the current situation is the multiplication and 
diversification of mediators between state and non-state 
institutions that contribute to translating the plaintiff’s issue 
and framing social facts into official legal texts (Chatterjee 
2004; Eckert 2006). A number of actors take part in 
transforming the voices of litigants, reformulating accounts 
to satisfy /p.13/ the requirements of legal categories, and 
exploring alternative parallel options among official legal 
provisions. Apart from lawyers who put the law at the service 
of a wide variety of groups in society (Galanter 1972), court 
professionals, police officers, NGOs, feminist groups, and 
mediator counsellors experiment with legal provisions, 
determining the form strategic negotiations take, legitimating 
‘competing constructions of reality through which the 
conflict may be expressed’ (Comaroff and Roberts, in Rosen 
2008:18). The court’s decision about the case may be based 
on the specific section that has been chosen to frame the case 
and on the judge’s personal attitude towards that section 
(Basu, in this volume).  
The question of the ‘reputation’ under which a law is 
submitted particularly emerges in the case of the ‘Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of) Atrocity Act’ 
which is often presented in upper-caste court milieus as being 
misused. According to this discourse, the Act would be used 
by Dalits as a way of exerting pressure on a member of an 
upper caste or of having him arrested immediately by filing a 
false case against him. The idea of being involved in a false 
case is commonly used in court as a defence strategy and 
Dalits themselves use this argument when they are involved 
in cases filed against them. However, as the case presented 
by Jaoul in this volume shows, victims may be persuaded to 
look for an out-of-court compromise in order to settle the 
case, paradoxically making the court a site of resistance 
against the antidiscriminatory legislation that it is supposed 
to implement.  
 
 These examples show how judicial procedure has to 
contend with social dynamics.
7
 However, as presented in the 
next section, law also constitutes a crucial modality of 
participation in state governance, reconciling the legislative 
process and the activism of civil society representatives. 
 
 
Law and the Public Sphere    
 
Legal reforms in South Asia have led to vibrant debates 
and discussions among litigators, legal practitioners such as 
police officers, judges, and lawyers, civil society institutions, 
and political leaders. The dialogue that has emerged around 
legal and constitutional processes has a long history in South 
Asia and can most recently be located in efforts towards 
writing a new constitution in Nepal; judicial activism in 
Pakistan; law /p.14/ reform in India, Public Interest 
Litigation, and the passing of new legislation have been 
motivated to a large extent by the efforts of social 
movements. The dialogue, political activities, and the 
relationships that have been formed around the law and 
practices of legality have led to the constitution of public 
spheres.  
The Habermasian notion of a public sphere—where people 
come together to engage in rational critical dialogue and 
where a person’s argument rather than their social position 
determines the course of dialogue—has been assessed in 
several ways, particularly in terms of who has access and can 
participate in the public sphere (Frazer 1990; Warner 2005). 
The way in which scholars have critically engaged in a 
Habermasian notion of the public sphere raises two sets of 
questions about the publics that are constituted around legal 
processes in South Asia. The first set concerns those who 
have access and can take part in these publics. How do 
people develop the competencies to become involved in 
debates and discussions around legal and constitutional 
reform? Who ends up excluded from these forms of 
engagement? The second set of questions pertains to how 
new ideas and dialogues that emerge from the 
implementation of laws, Supreme Court directives, or 
constitutional amendments circulate and are revised in 
different localities? How do people revise and resist new 
ideas, particularly those that criminalize existing social 
practices? How does constitutional law and judgments passed 
by higher-level courts impact practices at police stations and 
district courts, and the attitudes of legal practitioners, 
political leaders, litigators, and litigants?  
The themes and issues that emerged around the protests 
following the gang rape of a girl on a bus in December 2012 
shed light on the link between social movements and the law. 
During these protests men and women came together to 
demand stricter laws pertaining to violence against women, 
specifically reforms in the rape law and better 
implementation of the law. Along with an overwhelming 
turnout at public protests, a large number of ‘concerned 
citizens,’ were actively involved in debates both during the 
protests and on the inter-net, in newspapers, on the television, 
and radio about intricacies of the rape law and its 
implementation, the death penalty, marital rape, and 
women’s safety in the city. The language and ideas about 
legal reform that accompanied these protests are rooted in the 
campaign, protests, and advocacy of the women’s movement 
since the 1980s /p.15/ that has addressed the laws and legal 
practices legitimizing women’s subordination. Over the last 
three to four decades, women’s groups have campaigned for 
the revision of laws or advocated for new laws pertaining to 
crimes against women, including rape, sati, dowry, domestic 
violence, and sexual harassment at the workplace. The social 
mobilization and campaigns around legal reform set a 
precedent and created a discourse in the public sphere about 
violence against women and gender inequality, which shaped 
the contours of the debates and dialogues around the 
2012–2013 protests and the events that led to the passing of 
new anti-rape laws.  
Within the women’s movement there has been a vibrant 
debate about whether focusing on mobilization around legal 
reform enables the participation of women from different 
backgrounds. For example, critics have noted that the 
anti-rape protests in Delhi in 2012 were limited to the 
concerns of women in urban areas and that forms of political 
action were not framed in ways that address sexual violence 
faced by lower-caste, Dalit, and tribal women. These 
criticisms point to broader questions and issues: whether 
focusing on legal reforms restricts participation in the public 
sphere; the actual efficacy of implementing progressive 
legislation; and whether the latter can be applied to other 
social movements. In the context of the Dalit movement and 
the environmental protection movement, scholars have 
shown how the centrality of legal reform and court activism 
restricts people’s engagement in the public sphere and also 
co-opts political activism into the agenda of the liberal state 
(Rao 2009; Sundar 2009; Sivaramakrishnan 2011). Some of 
these scholars have simultaneously noted how legal reforms 
have changed the discourse in the public sphere and how a 
larger number of people now participate in protests, 
campaigns, and the making, passing, and implementation of 
the law (Sundar 2009; Sivaramakrishnan 2011).  
As mentioned above, in this volume, Jaoul describes the 
interactions and networks between Dalit activists, Dalit 
lawyers, and judges with respect to the Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe Prevention of Atrocities Act. While the 
conviction rate of those accused under this act may be low, 
the political mobilization and social activism around cases 
that are being tried under the Atrocities Act provide a 
momentum for Dalit activism. For example, Jaoul notes how 
local activists encourage villagers to file complaints and 
ensure that the police record them so that the offenders can 
be challenged in court. Furthermore, activists /p.16/ link 
specific cases of atrocities against Dalits to the demands 
made during protests that include dharnas (sit-ins) and 
gheraos or sequestering lower-level courts. Litigators are 
often integrated into the movement and in some cases they 
assist Dalit lawyers. Jaoul’s contribution shows how ideas 
and discourses pertaining to atrocities against Dalits that ani-
mate court interactions are then channeled through the 
networks and associations that are formed between activists, 
police officers, and lawyers. This process is facilitated when 
Dalit activists themselves become lawyers and by the 
presence of Dalit judges.  
While cases involving atrocities against Dalits provide a 
moral dimension that enables a particular kind of 
mobilization around the ‘atrocity’ category, the focus of 
cases pertaining to violence against women is often about 
charting the best course of action that will ensure institutional 
and family support for individual cases. In the wake of legal 
reforms pertaining to violence against women, government 
and non-government organizations, activists, and ad-hoc 
groups have emerged, which may or may not be associated 
with the women’s movement, and which address family 
disputes and cases of violence against women. Individuals 
linked to these organizations mediate between disputants and 
legal practitioners at the police station and at court. Basu’s 
contribution demonstrates how a range of organizations in 
Calcutta, whether affiliated to the then ruling left party or to 
autonomous women’s groups, assist women by providing 
counseling services and, as mentioned above, strategizing on 
how to address cases most effectively by drawing on both 
criminal and civil law. For years, the rule of the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal created a situation 
where the concerns and commitments of women’s groups 
were shaped by the priorities and commitments of the CPI 
(M) (Ray 1998). Basu shows that organizations which 
provided mediation services for people at court were often 
either directly linked to the CPI (M) or were able to draw on 
resources and connections with party members in order to 
assist disputants. However, together with party ideologies, 
the circulation of the ideas underlying legal reforms 
regarding violence against women, for example criminalizing 
domestic violence, was also crucial to informing the 
everyday practices and strategies employed by various 
organizations that assisted women in the court (Basu, in this 
volume).  
Legal reforms and constitutional amendments have led to a 
circulation of new ideas and concepts in the public sphere. 
The activities of /p.17/ social movements, lawyers’ 
movements, NGOs, and political parties provide networks 
and channels of communication that facilitate how new ideas 
circulate and are employed by different institutions. For 
example, Redding demonstrates how the Supreme Court in 
Pakistan responded positively to litigation prepared by a 
group of lawyers and concerned individuals who sought to 
protect the rights of transgendered individuals. The terms 
used to describe these individuals changed from the more 
colloquial term ‘hijra’ used in the report following the police 
raid to the more gender-neutral term ‘unix’ in the Supreme 
Court petition. The shifts in terminology impacted the groups 
of people who were actually categorized as ‘hijra’ and ‘unix,’ 
thereby also changing the meaning and political implications 
of what these terms imply. Redding’s contribution 
demonstrates how the languages and ideas of the state and 
the law revise and re-shape the meaning of concepts and 
terms in ways that may not have been previously anticipated 
by social movements.  
The contributions to this volume also demonstrate how 
new concepts and languages that emerge from the Supreme 
Court and constitutional directives are interpreted locally, 
and how criminal cases also become an arena where actors 
resist new state policies and constitutional directives. 
Letizia’s contribution about a person accused under the Arms 
and Ammunition Act in Nepal, and who was also suspected 
of being a part of a Hindu fundamentalist underground 
association, is framed in a larger context of ideas emerging 
from a newly declared secular state. The direction that the 
case took was shaped by the ways in which right-wing Hindu 
groups mobilized public sentiments of fear among some 
members of the Hindu majority who were also uncertain 
about what secularism entails. Letizia shows how these 
sentiments of fear were articulated by police officers and 
lawyers who admired the courage of the person accused in 
standing up to the policies of the secular state, thereby 
leading to a light sentence, given the nature of the evidence 
produced.  
All the contributions in this volume in some way 
demonstrate how criminal cases shape public opinion. The 
discourse around a criminal case reflects existing ideas in the 
public sphere and a case can also shape the ideas and 
languages around specific issues. The manner in which a 
criminal case leads to the formation of public opinion around 
new issues or reinforces widely held biases and prejudices 
depends on two /p.18/ inter-related factors. First, activists, 
lawyers, and judges are able to use political ideology and 
public commitments arising out of new laws and 
constitutional directives to build networks and public opinion 
around a particular case, which often shapes the direction the 
latter takes. Second, police officers, lawyers, and judges 
reflect widely held biases and prejudice regarding gender, 
caste, and religion. They use their authority to resist and to 
revise the issues arising from specific cases and legal 
practices, and court documents can reinforce existing biases 
and prejudice. There is therefore a disjuncture between, on 
the one hand, the ideas and values underlying new laws, 
constitutional amendments, and state policies, and on the 
other hand, histories of accumulated institutional practices 
and the training and preparation of police officers, lawyers, 
and judges.  
 
 
 
 
Mediation and the Production of Authority    
 
The contributions to this volume reveal how there is a 
discrepancy between the legal procedures outlined for 
example in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian 
Penal Code and ‘law as process’ or the everyday practices of 
different legal institutions. This discrepancy manifests itself 
in the ways in which local realities, community norms, 
individual concerns, and histories of accumulated 
institutional practices motivate each stage of the legal 
procedure. Negotiation and mediation between, on the one 
hand, police officers, lawyers, and magistrates and on the 
other hand legal practitioners characterize legal practices; for 
example, the way in which local leaders exercise control over 
how to police officers gather evidence and register a case, or 
how activists instruct disputants on what kind of testimony 
they should deliver in court. The contributions in this volume 
refer to how legal practitioners in different regions of South 
Asia explain to ethnographers how and why negotiation is an 
unavoidable aspect of the legal procedure. In some instances 
they refer to the constraints they face in their work as a result 
of the deficiencies and glitches in the ways institutions work. 
In other cases legal practitioners assert that communities and 
various groups of people are incapable of adhering to the 
legal procedure, for example, by not providing adequate 
evidence and testimony.  
Legal practice that consists of negotiation is commonly 
viewed as a corruption of the ideals of the law and of the 
proper legal procedure /p.19/ where unmediated face-to-face 
interaction between legal practitioners and disputants is seen 
to ensure impartial fact finding, evidence gathering, and 
passing a verdict. In India the practice of relying on local 
leaders and community-based institutions for everyday 
governance has been central to forms of state-making since 
the colonial period. Colonial officers relied on village 
panchayats, landlords, and headmen for governing 
communities that were seen as vast and impenetrable. These 
forms of everyday governance varied from one region to 
another and depended on specific conceptions of people and 
place. For example, in his work on jungle mahals or the 
frontier regions of Bengal, Sivaramakrishnan (1999) 
demonstrates how the colonial state drew on a ‘discourse of 
frontiers’, depicting certain areas as intractable and ‘zones of 
anomaly’ that shaped ideas of intransigence and 
difficult-to-administer places in order to justify relying on 
headmen and landlords for everyday governance. Such 
analyses reveal how mediation and negotiation, rather than an 
aberrant or anomalous ruptures to otherwise rule-bound 
practices, were crucial to state-making practices during the 
colonial period.  
Local leaders, middle men, and activists milling around the 
police station and the court perform a number of different 
roles. Mediators bring different parties to the police station 
and the court, confer with police officers and lawyers, and 
carry information back and forth between legal practitioners 
and litigators. They make the law accessible; they are capable 
of bending legal procedures; they act as go-betweens 
explaining the intricacies of a case to the police and lawyers; 
and they translate and simplify the law and legal procedures 
for disputants. Local leaders and activists who act on behalf 
of disputants organize meetings between legal practitioners 
and litigants, strategize about the best course of action, and 
they prepare and train people, including witnesses, on how to 
respond to lawyers in court. These leaders also facilitate 
negotiations in and around the police station before a case is 
registered, and during the trial’s proceedings they may 
facilitate out-of-court agreements or may attempt to coax the 
accused into pleading guilty. In some cases what is at stake 
for disputants are the networks and associations that emerge 
during the interactions and negotiations between leaders and 
legal practitioners, rather than the court verdict or achieving 
justice.  
 
Social scientists have pointed to the intentions of local 
leaders, middle men, brokers, fixers, and ‘big men’ who 
assist people in accessing resources, negotiating with state 
officials and legal practitioners, and in /p.20/ addressing 
neighbourhood and village disputes (Hansen 2001; Eckert 
2004). These leaders wield power and influence in their 
communities and often draw on their vast network of 
connections and associations at critical moments, for 
example at the time of elections. The contributions to this 
volume demonstrate similar intentions among leaders who 
become involved in the work of mediation in the context of 
legal institutions. Bordia’s analysis (Chapter 6 in this 
volume) of the events around a murder case among Girassia 
tribals in Southern Rajasthan demonstrates how tribal leaders 
assist villagers involved in a case in order to gain authority in 
villages. Tribal leaders gain visibility by establishing 
associations and networks with other leaders in different 
villages and by demonstrating their connections with police 
officers and lawyers. Therefore, the direction that a case 
takes depends on whether tribal leaders are willing and 
successful in undertaking negotiations with other tribal 
leaders, panchayat leaders (or leaders of the village council), 
and legal practitioners. As mentioned above, Jaoul and Basu 
reveal different processes around mediation and negotiation 
pertaining to progressive legislation for Dalits and women 
respectively. In such instances, activists and social workers 
draw on litigation to mobilize people around issues of 
violence against women and atrocities against Dalits and 
involve litigants in wider social movements.  
In some cases in the South Asian context, police officers, 
lawyers, and judges also often perform the role of mediation. 
Headley (Chapter 7 in this volume) demonstrates the case 
against panchayattars or panchayat leaders who were accused 
of meting out unfair punishment to a woman in the context of 
a matrimonial dispute. The judge did not convict the 
panchayattars but condemned their practice in the harshest 
terms. He also convinced the woman to withdraw her case 
against her husband and in-laws. Headley reports that while 
reflecting on the court proceedings, the judge stated that he 
conducted a panchayat between the husband and wife by 
making them reach a compromise. By describing the court 
proceeding as a panchayat, the judge echoes popular ideas 
that are reflected in short stories, films, and other descriptions 
of village life, where panchayat leaders understand their 
community, personally know disputants, mediate between the 
people involved in a dispute, and above all attempt to arrive 
at a compromise in order to ensure village harmony. Such 
forms of justice are perceived as different from state law 
where the focus is on objectivity; the judge delivers a verdict, 
and there /p.21/ are winners and losers. When judges 
describe court practices or verdicts as ‘panchayati justice’, 
they justify mediation and compromise within the court room 
and deviation from statutory legal practice by evoking forms 
of justice that are often represented as the ideals of 
community life in India as in the case above. In other 
instances, commentators have used the phrase ‘panchayati 
justice’ to condemn a particular verdict as partial and catering 
to the sentiments of specific communities.
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The forms of mediation that are associated with a criminal 
case depend on popular perceptions about different legal 
systems and how various communities are seen to access 
either state law or non-state law. Cases outlined in this 
volume reveal how legal practitioners believe that particular 
groups of people are incapable of providing sufficient 
evidence, of adhering to court procedure, and are better 
governed through their own customs and panchayat 
institutions as the latter are more equipped to understand the 
sentiments of a community. Litigators often believe that 
police and court practices are dense and complicated and that 
they can only navigate these procedures with the assistance 
of mediators and community-based leaders.  
Contributions in this volume demonstrate that legal 
practitioners describe their work in terms of ideas of 
objectivity, impartiality, neutrality, and equality. And yet 
they claim that local constraints and social contexts prevent 
them from actualizing these values in everyday practices at 
the police station and the court. Litigators and mediators 
seldom expect to encounter these ideal values of the law 
when they access legal institutions. People are well aware 
that police- and court-specific procedures have been shaped 
by local history, culture, and politics, and litigators and 
mediators must attune to these procedures in order to 
navigate these institutions.  
 
 
Notes  
 
1 . One remarkable exception is the work of Pratiksha Baxi 
which focuses on the ethnography of rape cases in Gujarat 
Session courts (Baxi 2014). Jayanth Krishnan recently 
headed a comparative study on the function of District Courts 
in three Indian states (Krishnan et al. forthcoming).  
 
2 . Aside from social science literature on Indian justice, 
there are numerous Indian jurists and university professors of 
law who regularly publish material in specialised journals 
devoted to Indian legal studies. The number of socially /p.22/ 
committed studies of this kind has recently increased with a 
number of recent works exploring the social, political, and 
socio-legal implications of legal texts, judges’ decisions or 
other judicial reports, with the intention of denouncing either 
social injustice or the dysfunction of the system in order to 
suggest possible ways of improving it. This commitment to 
socio-legal activism tends to blur the distinction between 
jurists and committed social scientists, for instance in debates 
on a unified civil code versus personal law, or on the 
reservation policy, gender inequality, human rights, or 
environmental protection (Sathe 2002; Baxi 1982; Agnes 
1999; Larson 2001; Menski 1998).  
 3 . Tag questions are often preceded by a statement that 
makes the answers almost irrelevant (Conley and O’Barr 
2005: 26).  
 
 
4 . Furthermore, the passage from speech to writing is most 
often a shift from the vernacular language to English, a 
language that most people involved in the case—the victim, 
accused, witnesses—do not even understand.  
 
5 . Nowadays, the practice of transcribing verbal interactions 
in court does not seemingly depend on the difference 
between common law and Romanist procedures as was the 
case in the past where Romanist procedures stipulated that all 
the evidence be compiled into a full written report (Shapiro 
1981: 38).  
 
6 . Similarly to what happens during Anglo-American trials, 
this implies that when the case goes to appeal everything has 
to be done all over again (Bouillier in this volume).  
 
7 . See Baxi (2003) and Guha (1989). For an historical 
analysis of these theories see Wardhaugh (2005), Ludden 
(2001), and Sivaramakrishnan (2008).  
 
8 . This was the case when Rajeev Dhawan described the 
judgment on the Ayodhya issue as ‘panchayati justice’ as he 
said that it takes away the legal rights of Muslims and 
converts the moral sentimental entitlements of Hindus into 
legal rights.’  
See: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/ 
panchayati-justice-that-takes-away-legal-rights-of-muslims-r
ajeev-dhavan/ article805552.ece.       
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